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Preliminaries 
This paper assumes. along with many others, including Barwise and Cooper ( HJSl ), 
Stump (1981. 198,5). Chierchia (198S, 1990), Schwarzschilcl (HJS9), and de Swart 
(l\!9:3), that adverbs of quantification (the boldface elements in (1), also called Q­
adverb,) are generalized quantifiers, and attempts to make explicit the prncess by 
which the domain of these quantifiers is computed. 
(1) a. Jan often butters her bread. 
b. Peter usually goes to the theater if he is town. 
c. Bobby always shaves when he showers. 
cl. Marcia sometimes buys TURl(!SH coffee. 
:S:ow. the example in (la) (probably) does not mean that on most occasions (morning, 
noon or night) we can expect to fine\ Jan· buttering her bread. Rather, its meaning 
rnn be roughly paraphrased by something like (2), where an explicit clause is taken 
to provide some restriction on the domain of quantification. 
1This. is a work in progress and as such any comment~ vmuld be greatly appreci~te<l. The 
materi2d herein \\'oulcl undoubtedly he much worse without the help and comments of Peter Culicover, 
Clnistian Innerhoffer, Louise Mc:'ially, Junko Tsumaki, Svetlana Vasina and, especiaHy, Craige 
Rohert,s. These people. of course, should not be held responsible for any remaining errors. This 
work also owes an obvious debt to van Fin tel (1995), a draft of which I received while preparing t.his 
manuscript.. Although our proposals differ in the end. they are in tbe same spirit, and he identified 
<1ncl solved many problems for me. 
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(2) Whcu Jan has bread and is going to eat it, she often butters it. 
Similarly, the quantifiers in (lb)-( lei) also involve domain restriction. In (lb), u.sua/ly 
seems to range only over situations in which Peter is in town; ( le) has ( at least.) 
two readings, paraphrased in (3a) and (:3b); and (ld), with intonatiom,l promineuce 
indicated in all ca.pita.I letters and thus on the word Turkish, can be ta.ken to mean 
somethiug like ( 3c). 
(3) a. When Bobby shaves, he is always showering. 
b. When Bobby is in the shower, he always shaves. 
c. When Marcia buys coffee, she sometimes buys Tnrkish coffee. 
As von Fint.el (1995) notes, "considerable machinery" has been proposed recently to 
derive the correct restriction in cases like those above. For example, llooth ( 1985, 
199 I /:i ), l(rifka ( 1992) and Partee ( H/91) propose that focused m<1terial is ma.pped 
into a11 ex(,licit restrictive clause in a t.ripart.it.e structure at the level of LF. Die.sing 
( lWJO, 199:2) and Johnston (1994) map VP-external material into ii simil;u LF struc­
ture. while Berman (1990) and Chierchia (1992, 1993) also assume the existence of 
a tripartite representation at. the level of syntax/semantics, to be filled by rnaterial 
presupposed by the nuclear scope and topics, respc,ctively. 
I will instead argue, along with von Fintcl and in keeping with recent work by 
Roberts (1D91), Rooth (1992) and Schwarzschild (199:J). that the determination of 
these qna.nt.ifiers' restrictions is pragmatic. More concretely, I will propose t.ha.t a 
pragmatic theory of information structure like that proposed by Roberts ( 1995) 
leads 11aturally to a unified, presupposition-based account of domain restriction, in 
which opera.tors of this type range freely over a set of sit.nations "u11der discnssio11" 
a.(. a givc11 place i11 discourse. The account differs from that of von Fintd ( 1995) in 
that it docs not <1ppeal to any rcl<1tio11 between a. sententi<1lly-introclnced anaphoric 
elerne11t a11d a. set of "discourse topics." Ra.ther, I provide an account based on the 
otherwise-motivated relations of congruence and presupposition satisfaction and 
show tha.t an approach of this type can more adcqu<1tcly deal with a ra.ngc of data 
t.ha.t includes examples that have heretofore been problematic for the "a11aphoric" 
accounts n1entionecl a.hove. 
Theoretical Background 
2.1 A Structured Context 
I am going to assume a theory of context along the lines of Roberts (1995), which in 
turn is an enrichment of the ideas of Stalnaker (1979) and Carlson (1983). 1 The key 
idea. will he that discourse is orgnnized around a series of conversational goals. a.ncl 
that the primary goal of discourse is communal inquiry. That is, participants in a 
discourse a.re attempting to share with each other information about the world, and 
they go about this undertaking by addressing implicit and explicit questions. The 
brief introduction will, without doubt\ do injustices to just about everyone involved in this 
line of research. Readers are strongly encouraged to dig up Roberts (1995) for a more complet.e 
introduction. 
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iuformation tlwt iuterlocutorn share (or behavP as if they heIi eve t,o lw tl'\I<') can lw 
modelled. as in Stalnaker (1979), as a set of propositions knowu as the common 
ground. Ass11ming Kratzcr's ( 1989) vcrRion of sitnation semantics. in which situa­
tious are parts of possible worlds, we will take propositions to be sets of situations, 
The common ground, in turn, will be a set of sets of situations that the interlocutors 
ta.kc to hold. The intersection of the common ground, StaJnaker's context set. is 
also a nseful notion. Intuitively, this set will be the set. of situations where ,ill the 
propositions in the common ground are true. That is, assnmi11g that the interlocutors 
an• rational and so forth, the context set is a set. of ca11rlicla.te situc1tious for realit.1· 
The goal of discourse can be sta.ted in terms of thr: context sd a.s follows: i11terloc:1­
tors try to reduce t.he context. set t.o a. singleton; that is. they t.ry to hurl tlw pos.si 1,le 
\\'oriel (which is just a la.rge-enough situation) that capt mes th<: wa:'° things Mc. 
Th,, cxcha,ng<' of information it.self is rnodell<'d by a. sPt of moves. of which therP 
are two types. Questions count as what, Carlson would c,dl -~tt ll}J mo er .s: a:--scrt ion:-. 
ca.n lw thought of a.s payoff moves. As the terms suggest.. tlwsc mo\·es come in pcir.s: 
a quest.ion is asked (set-up) a.nd a.n assertion answers (p,iyoff). On tlw surface·. it 111c1y 
seem absurd t.o claim that discourse procf'Pds in this wa,y. That is. we can think of 
m,my dialogues in which a.n assertion is mac!P out of the blue. or in which a seri<:s 
of questions is asked with no a.ssert.ions in between. I would snggPst. hm1·ever. thilt 
in the former case. the asserti011 comes as answer to a.n implicit qncstio11. which mu 
be infetT<'d by va.rious rnes ;rnd is a.t the v0ry lea.st an answPr to the "Rig Q1ieslion" 
( J,J.'ha/ i., the way thing.s areY). In the la.tter c;1se, it. is mcrclv that the inl<'rloculurs 
at·<' enumeratiug a plan to answer some larger quest.ion by a seriPs of .,uh-quest ions. 
and t,hat these sub-questions are answered one at, a. time in the order in \\'hich they 
are accept.eel. For example, suppose that Carol and Mike arc cleaning up in the 
aftern1ath of a wild party and wish to answer the quest,ion M'ho drnnk whoti. The,Y 
111ay a.tt.Pmpt to a.nswr,r this by addressing the sub-qnestions Whal did Bobby rf,,ink'1. 
(,f,'Jwt did Pt:!cr drinld, Whal did Grr:y drinkY and so forth. l\ot.e th;,t answers lo '111 
the sub-questions would provide an answer to t.]l(' large qurnt.ion. ,rnd note also t lwt 
e11rb of the ,Sldi-qucstions need not be explicitly asked (i.e .. realized as a S[J<'cclr .ict ). 
What is import,ant. is simply that both interlocutors can figm<' out that tlwse are t lie 
questions being aclclressecl, a.ml that they arc answered one at a tirne.'3 
So what exactly is a mov<'? vVell, we first note that, moves are essentiall,\· senlilntic 
Pnt.ities a.ncl that a giYen move ca.n he intPrpreted in two climen.sions. Tllilt, is. 11 it,!, 
eacb move W<' will associate with it presupposed content and proferred content:' 
Profr... rr('cl content is wha.t is asserted in an ass!:'rtion. and thf' 11on-pn::>supJ>00Pd cont Pnt 
of <[Hf'st.ions. In terms of the goals we have «lluded to before. qtwstiun 111ovcs ,\.l'<' a 
type of imperativ<' which profer a set of a.lternati\'es and dictate that \he interlocu1ors 
choos<' among them. More specifically, the alternatives determi,wcl by a qu<0 .,t.ion ,·an 
be takell to lw the set of propositions which arr tlw possibk answers tot.hr question. 
Another wa.y of viewing these proferred alternatives. suggested by Groe11e11dijk t. 
St.old1of (HJ84), is this: "question partitions 1.lre context set into sets of \\'oriels in 
which one complete answ,er to the qtt<'stion is true. For example. the question j,\i/11 ,., 
did Robin go last Thursdayi' will pa.rt.it.ion the context set. into sets of worlds wlwr<e, for 
example, Robin went to Greece last Tlrnrsda.y. Robin went to Turke,' last Thursday. 
Roberts (1995) and below for more discussion of these issues. 
•1The terms here, like t.hose iu much of t.h.is st'ction, are Rohert.s', 
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Robin went to Italy last Thursday and so forth. Assertions, .in turn, simply denote 
propositions in the traditional sense and shrink the context set by selecting from the 
partitions proferrecl by the question to which the assertion is a complete answer. To 
continue our simple example, the assertion Robin went to GREECE last Th1i-rsday 
will pick out in the context set all and only those worlds in which it was Greece where 
Robin went la.st Thursday, as opposed to Italy or Turkey or some other place. The 
mechanism by which it does this is quite straightforward. If an assertion is accepted 
by the interlocutors in a discourse, it is simply added to the common ground, with 
the desired shrinking of the context set following by definition. 
2.2 Presupposition, Questions and Congruence 
Language is a cooperative undertaking and it is in the best interest of the interlocu­
tors in a. given discourse to be as explicit as possible about what they believe to be the 
propositions in the common ground and what they believe to be the current. question 
being addressed, which from now on we will refer to as the question under discus­
sion. On the other hand, if we ha.cl to enumerate explicitly everything we believed to 
be true about the worlclbefore, for example, asking whether or not there was milk in 
the refrigerator, we would expect language to be a quite cumbersome a.ncl inefficierit. 
means of gathering information. It is not. 
Rather. it has been argued that a number of conventional "tricks" are available 
to participants in a. given discourse that can be·usecl to indicate to other participants 
what is believed to be, for example, the question under discussion or other information 
in the common ground. By using these tricks, we can keep the discourse coherent 
in crucial respects without having to waste a lot of time asking obvious questions or 
providing background information. 
In light of the goals and structure of discourse sketched above, presupposition is 
certainly used for this purpose in the sense that it enables interlocutors to m,1ke surP 
they a.re considering sets of situations that a.re similar in crucial respects, i.e., with 
respect to the information in the common ground. That is, if we adopt a notion of 
presupposition akin to Stalna.ker's (1979) or Heim's (1983, 1992), ma.de explicit in 
(4). it follows that the set of candidate situations at any given point (which we have 
been calling the context set) will have to be a subset of the set of situations in any 
presupposition. If a situation is in the context set, however, it must belong to a.II the 
propositions in the common ground. Hence, any presupposition wouli also have t.o 
be in or be entailed by the propositions in the common ground. 
(4) An ut.terance ¢ presupposes proposition JJ iff ¢ is felicitous in a.ny given context 
c only when c I= p. 
Of course. interlocutors come into every exchange with different information about 
the world, so isn't it unreasonable to expect that every presupposition in a. given 
discourse will be in the set of propositions that the participants all believe to be 
true? Well, yes, but in general this does not cause the discourse to grind to a ha.it. 
As Roberts (1995:10-11) puts it: "If an utterance has a conventionally expressed 
presupposit,ion, it is often quite clear what the context should be like in order for it, to 
be felicitous. And if the context isn't quite like that but the hearer is cooperative a.nd 
ha.5 no objPction to the truth of the presupposed information. he will a.ccommoda.t.,, 
it. - behave as if the context included that information all along." 
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The notion of presupposition can also be used to explain why cert,ain utterances 
are frlicitous answers to certain questions while others are not. Consid<>r. for Px11rnplc • 
the question in (,i) and the answers in ((i): 
(!i) Where clid ?vfarcia go last year? 
(0) ,1. :Vlilrcia went to GREECE last year. 
b. #MARCIA went to Greece last year. 
c. #Marcia went to Greece last YEAR. 
<I. #Marcia went to Greece LAST year. 
lt i, dc,11 that, .,peaking just on an intuitive level at this poiut, that. the utternnc,· in 
(Ga) felicitonsly answers (5) while the ntterances in (6b)-(6d) seem to b<' infelicitous 
in this context. or \.o answer some other questions. It is also the ca.SC' that (6a)-(licl) 
differ only in the placement of prosodic focus (inclica.t.ecl again by capital letters). 
The focts ,ilioYe can be explained, it seems, if we assume (like Rooth (1!)85,1992). 
1·011 Steclww ( l CJ~9) and most recently Roberts (1995)) that assertions, like questions, 
are alrn associated with sets of a.lterna.tives, and that a relationship (congruence) is 
presupposed to hold bet.we<'n the alternative sets of felicitous question/answPr pairs. 
Tlw rni.ssiug link. of coursf', will he that the prosodic focus of a given assertion serves 
to ( pill'tiall.,·) determine the set of alternatives associated with that assertion. and 
i11 tbis way to indirectly constrain the question which it ca.n answer, as .fackendoff 
( l'.)~2) first suggested. We'll develop this proposal her<, along lines suggested by von 
:-,1,,clww (l'JSCJ) am! Roberts (HJ9.S).' 
We lwgin b,· making f'Xplicit the process by which alternative sets are determined 
for c1s~ertio11s a.11d quc':>tions. The case of assertions is quite si111ple if we assu1ne 
( rnrrPCt.l.v. I think) that each assertion has a.t !Past one focused constituent." That is, 
sonwthing like Ii) will snflice. 
(7) The focus alternative set corresponding to a. constituent /1. \\!3\1, is tlw set 
ui' <1.ll i11lerpret.ations obtained by replacing a.11 (functionally - m.c) focused 
constituents in ,3 with variables, and then intc,rpreting the result rela.t.ivc to 
cacb member of the s<"t of all assignment. functions which va.ry a.t most. in the 
1·al11es the_\' assign to those variables. (Roberts HJ%:M) 
So. for e:,;a.mple. the set of altenrntives associated with (Ga) wonld be the resnlt of 
repl,IC'ing tlw coustitueul Greect with a. variable of the a.ppropri,1.te sort (say, a variable 
ovc>r place.s) ,rncl ranging over all other variables in thP domain.of that sort. vVha.t. WP 
get i~ ;:1 :-:Pt, of propositions P such that: 
-,,\·c 'II as::.ume, cilong with Roberts, that. the alternatives associat.<~d wit.h an assertion ca11 lw 
tli(1Hght of c1.s part of its pretiupposed cont.eat. . as opposed the proferrt-'d alt.en1at.ives posit.eel iu th<.." 
pn,v1ous ~ect.ion for questions. Thi:-:; aUows us to maiutain the position oft.he previous section t.hat. 
;i~~1°t tiuus -;imply prufor pro posit.ions. 
''l111port.,tnt!y, wt>'ll s;i.y that this const.itue11t. must. contain a prosodically forusecl ckmcnt., hut 
ll{'ed nut be 1•qual to a prosodicnlly focused element. So, in the sentence Greg alimtyt. bullcn his 
BflE.1D. for t'x21111pk·, po,,sib!e focused constituents would be lits l1rcnd, buftfrs his inntd, a/w(IIJb 
huittn, /11.s l1tcad or Gre:J Hlw<ty.s bulto·:; his bread. In order to distinguish prosodic focus from 
'"fu11nio110.l" focus. we will mark the latter with brackets aml a subscript. F. 
6 MIKE CALCAGNO 
(8) P = { JJ I (3u E D)[p = Marcia went to u last year]} 
Computing the alternatives &5sociated with questions is a. bit more tricky. In the 
previous section, it was suggested that questions profer alternatives. This cannot 
be totally correct, if we a.re to maintain a coherent view of the nature of common 
ground. That is, the common ground is taken to be a set of propositions, a.nd the 
alternative sets we've been entertaining thus far are also sets of propositions. This 
would suggest that questions are somehow incompatible with being a.dded to the 
common ground, or that they a.re added to the comnion ground in a different way. 
This is undesirable for a number of reasons, one of which being that we would Jik., 
to check the felicity of questions with respect to presupposition just as we check the 
fr,[icity of assertions, a.nd we cannot do this without the content. of the question being 
a.dclecl t.o t.he common ground. Fortunately, von Stechow (1989) provides a solution 
to t.his little puzzle by providing a semantics for questions in which they do, i11 fact. 
denote a particular type of proposition, which is related to the set of alternatives that 
we need for our definition of congruence. This set of alternatives can be computed 
sepa.ra.tely. in accordance with (9), where l/31 stands for the "regular'' denotation of 
d: 
(9) The Q-alternatives corresponding to a.n utterance o:, Q.4.(o:), are 
{ p I (3ui-l, ... ,ui-n E D)[p = IJ3l(tti-l) ... (tti-")J}, where 
a. o has the logica.l form wh;_1 , ... , wh;_,.(13), with { wh;_1 , .. ., wh;_,, } bt>ing 
t.ht> possibly empty set of wh-elements in n, and 
b. D is the domain of the model for the language, suita.bly restricted by sort. 
(Roberts 199.5:14) 
The "regular'' denotation of a question will be the proposition expressed in ( 10). 
Note that this proposition is closely related to the Q-a.lt.ernatives above in t.lia.t it just 
picks out t.host> situations in which all the Q-alternatives are ·•asked." By this. we 
mean somet.l1ing like (as Robert.s (p.c.) suggests) the truth of a.11 the Q-a.lterrrntivPs is 
under consideration by the interlocutors, or is being evaluated by the interlocutors. 
In this way. questions do, in fa.ct, profer alternatives. albeit in an indirect way. We 
will return t,o this discussion in §:3. 
(10) Interpretation of ?(o:): 
lfol = {s IVp E Q.4.(u), p is asked ins}. 
Now, returning to om example, the set of Q-a.lternatives associated with (.5), which 
we a:;sumeto have the logica.l form in ( 11) will be the set of propositions Q expressed 
in ( 12). 
(11) '?[where(,\x,Marcia went to x last year)] 
(12) CJ= { JJ I (3u E D)[p = l,\,r.Marcia went to x last yearl(u)J} 
= { p I (3u E D)[p = Marcia went to 11 last year]} 
Congruence, then, expressed formally in ( 13), is a. relation between some utterance 
aud a. quest.ion that requires that the focal alternatives of the utterance be the same 
set as the Q-alternatives of the question. 
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(1:3) Move J3 is congruent to a question ?er iff 11/311 = QA(cr). 
It. is ea.sy to see that the Q-alternatives of (.5), expressed in (12), are the same as those 
of ((ia). which are expressed in (8). It should also be clear that the focal alternatives of 
(6b)-(Gd) will be different than (12). These examples are thus ruled out as congruent 
to ( 5 ). and thus violate the presupposition that they be congruent to the question 
under discussion. That is. the infelicity of these utterances is predictrd as a case of 
presupposition failure. 
And. as in any case of presupposition failure, we would expect accommodation 
to pla.y a role. That is, consider the case where a sentence like (Gb) is uttered out 
of blue (i.e., with no explicit question under discussion). We can say that it is still 
the case that this utterance is presupposed to be congruent with a question under 
disrnssion, although we may not know what that question is. or we may not have been 
explicit about what that question is. Vo/e do know, however, that if the congruence 
presupposition is to be satisfied. the Q-altenrntives associated with the question under 
discussion must be the same as the focal altematives of (6b) (given in (14)). 
(14) { p 1. (311 E D)[p = u went to Greece last year]} 
Tliat is. we know that the utterer of (6b) wishes to entertain a set of Q-alternatives 
that are the same as those in ( 14). If this is not objectionable to the other interlocutors 
in the discourse, they will be accommodated, which in the end has the effect of 
introducing into the common ground, some question whose denotation is given in 
(15). One such question would be Who went to Greece last year'?. 
(15) { s IVp E { p I(:ht E D)[p =u went to Greece last year]}. p is asked ins} 
The Domain of Q-Adverbs 
vVith these technical details out of the way, I would like to turn now to the central 
issue~ of the paper: namely, the question of how the domain of adverbs of quantification 
is det.ermined. As alluded to in the introduction, a number of proposals have surfaced 
in n~ceut years, and most of these assume the existence of a tripartite structme one 
of whose elements is a. restrictive clause. The material that gets mapped into this 
restrictive clause has been a topic of great debate. In this section, I will discuss what 
I take to be three ma.jar types of these proposals, and will argue both that they all 
have an element of truth to them, and that in the encl they are all incomplete or 
inadequate in some way. 
The view that should emerge, I will argue. is that it is impossible to correctly 
d<>terrnine the domain of a Q-adverb without considei'ing the question under disrns­
sion when the utterance conta.ini;1g the Q-a.dverb is introduced. In §4, I will argue 
thai. the obsei'vations in this section are compatible with a purely pragmatic theory 
of domain restriction, and that such a. theory accounts for a wider. range of facts in a 
more adequate and more elegant manner. 
3.1 Restrictive Clauses 
Ju the classic GQ analysis of determiners, the restriction and nuclear scope of a given 
quantifier is given by an obligatory syntactic clause. That is, in (16), the claus0 
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woman in /ht room denotes the set of entities in t'Very's restriction, while has won a 
Nobel Pri::f denotes the set corresponding to the nuclear scope. The quantifier simply 
expresses a relation between these two sets. 
(Hi) Every woman in the room has won a Nobel Prize. 
t'ulike det,erminers, however, an adverb of quantification does not require an explicit 
restrictive clause, although it has been argued that such clauses are available on an 
optional basis. Temporal adverbial clauses headed by adverbs like when, after and 
b,forc. as well as ifclaitses and temporal PP-adjuncts, seem like good candidates for 
this role. as the exa.mJ'iles in ( 17) illustrate. 
(17) a. The heater is always on when people a.re in the house. 
b. Tht• river is always at flood stage after it rains. 
c. TllP heater is a.lways on if it is cold outside. 
cl. Till' river is a.lways at flood stage on Sundays. 
Cc;rt.ainly, an example like ( 17a) ca.n mean that the set of cases in which people are 
present. in the house is a subset of cases in which the heater is on. 
The facts, however, are considerably more complex than these simple examples 
suggest.. Consider, for example, the utterances in (18). 
(l8) a. Marcia always takes t.he bus home when it rains. 
b. Marcia. always takes the bus home after it rains. 
c. Marcia. always takes the bus home if it rajns. 
cl. Marcia a.I ways takes the bus home on Sundays. 
It is clear t.ha.t the quantifier in, for example, ( 18a.) does not range over cases in which 
it, is raining. but rather cases in which it is raining AND Marcia. is going home. That is, 
t.he when-clause in this example determines an aspect of the domain of quantification, 
but is not by itself strong enough to provide a completely restrict.eel domain. Any 
a.na.lysis ol' this phenomena., then, which naively mapped the information in temporn.l 
adverbials into a. Q-adverb's restriction and stopped at that would make the wrong 
pn~dicitions in the cases above. Few, however, would be so naive, since it has bPen 
widely obsL•rved that the domain of quantifica.tiona.l determiners ca.n be restricted by 
cont,extual fact.ors. and we would not expect quantificational adverbs to behave any 
differently, especially given the fact that they may appear without overt syntactic 
restriction in a va.riety of cases. One possible generalization, then, would be that the 
modifiers in ( 18) always constrain the restriction of the Q-a.dverb, thus allowing for 
the possibility of a.clditiona.! restriction by contextual information. A proposal more 
or less a.long these lines was ma.de by Lewis (1975), Stump (1981, 198,5). Farkas and 
Sugioka. (1')8:3), Partee (1U84), Farkas (1985), and Berman (1991). 
However, these proposals cannot be correct, either. Johnston (1994), for exam­
ple, notes that the utterances in (18) have more than one reading. In one possible 
readiug, predicted to exist by the accounts above, the adjunct (pa.rtially) provides 
the restriction for the Q-adverb. This reading naturally arises when the examples in 
(18) are used to answer questions like those in (19). 
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(HJ) a.. How does Marcia get home when it rains'? 
b. How does Marcia. get home after it rains'? 
c. How does Marcia get home if it rains'? 
cl. How does Marcia. get home on Sundays? 
The second reading, which is not accounted for by the proposals above, is one in 
which the luia.d clause (a.gain, partially) provides the restriction. This reading Mises 
1111!.urnlly when the utterances in (18) a.re used to answer the question in (20). 7 
(20) When does Marcia, ta.ke the bus home"/ 
On t.he basis of these examples . .Johnston proposes that the utterances in ( 18) arP 
actua.lly structura.lly ambiguous, and that the readings above a.rise as a. result of this 
ambiguity, That is, for .Johnston, an example like ( lSa.) can be associated with either 
structure in (21). In (21a), the when-clause is adjoined to IP while in (21b) the same 
clause is adjoined to VP. 8 
(21) a, [IP [IP Marcia always [vP takes the bus home]] [PP whenit is raining]] 
b. [1p·Ma.rcia.·a.lwa.ys [vP[vP takes the bus home] [PP when it is raining]]] 
The existence of the two readings a.re then explained by assuming the existence of a 
tripartite structure at LF. and adopting a form of Diesing's (1992) mapping hypot,h­
<csis, given below in (22). 
(22) Determining the Restriction and Nuclear Scope of an Adverb of 
Quantification: 
(i) Make the adverb of quantification the first element in the tripartite struc­
t.ure. 
(ii) Factor material from the VP in the scope of the adverb of quantification 
into the nuclear scope. 
(iii) Factor material adjoined to IP or in the Spec of IP into the restriction. 
(Johnston 1994:35) 
R<'turning to our example, we can see that in (2la.) t,he when-clause ;ill be ma.ppecUiu 
accordance with the principle in (22)) into thE' restriction, giving us the reading whE're 
this clause restricts the domain of the Q-adverb. The structme in (21 b ). howPvc•r. 
does not. immediately give us the other reading, as Johnston would like. That is. iu 
this structme nothing (except the moved subject Marcia) is either adjoiued to or in 
the Spec of IP, and thus nothing is mapped into the restriction. But, a.s .Johnston 
'.Johnston act.ua.lly claims that adjunct clauses headed by the elements if and wlie11<,·11fr havl" 
only the reading in which the adjunct provides the l'est.ridion, To my ear, howeveL·, bot.h (18c) and 
Marcia takes the bus home whenever it. rains seem like felicitous answers to {20) and thus have t.heir 
restrict.ions constrained by t.he head clause. 
8 1 am simplifying his structures somewhat, in that he adopts the VP-internal subject. hypot.hr~­
sis, and t.lrns ·posits moVement. oft.he subject into some VP-ext.ernal posit,ion a.t. surface strndure. 
Nothing hinges on t.his, as far as I can tell. 
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notes. t.he Q-adverb in this utterance is not left unrestricted, so we must instead 
posit some mechanism by which the information in the head clause is copied into the 
restriction at LF..Johnston proposes that a process of variable binding, coupled with 
a genera.I constra.int aga.inst vacuous quantification can provide this mechanism. but. 
t.he account. seems otherwise unmotivated. In addition, is not dear why it 111ust I><· th,· 
head clause that is copied into the nuclear scope, and this predicts that the reading 
in which the adjunct restricts the quantifier domain should also be available for the 
strncture in (21b). I would maintain that this spmious ambiguity is something to 
avoid. lu any c11se. the tat.tered nmpping hypothesis ends up looking like (2:3), and 
on this view the syntactic structure underspecifies the semantic structure. 
(2:l) Determining the Restriction and Nuclear Scope of an Adverb of· 
Quantification: 
(i) !\fake the adverb of quantification tJw first element. in the tripartite struc­
t.ure. 
(ii) Fa.ct.or material from t.he VP in the scope of the adverb of quantification 
into either the restrictive clause or the nuclear scope. 
(iii) Factor material adjoined to IP or in the Spec of IP into the restriction, 
( .Johnston 1994:,ll) 
So where does this discussion leave us? We have shown to be inadequate ana.lyses 
which attempt, to directly correlate the denotation of a particular adverbial a.djunct 
with the restriction of Q-adverbs. On the one hand, we have seen cases where the 
restriction suggested by these clauses is incomplete, and, on the other haml. w~ !Jan~ 
introduced cases where the relevant clause doesn't seem to correspond to the restric­
tion at all. In addit.ion, we have shown that a proposa.l by Johnston (HJ94). based on 
the work of Diesing, which provides a syntactic expla.nation for the facts abo\'e, leads 
to inelegan1 and otherwise unmotivated complications in the syntax-semantics inter­
face. Even if .Johnston's proposal were correct, it should be pointed out, his theory of 
doma.in restriction would still be incomplete in that he provides no explicit mechanism 
by which Q-adverbs that do not co-occur with explicit adverbial modifiers get their 
domain rest.riction, nor any mechanism by which contextual restrictions could arise. 
I would argue instead that the key to these examples lies with the question under 
discussion at the time at which the utterance is introduced. For those cases ill which, 
for exampl(','a when-clause appears to restrict the Q-adverb, it must. be t.he case t,lrn.t 
it is being used in response to a question like ( HJ). In cases where it does not, then the 
ques1.ion under discussion must be like (20). In either case, it is the question that is 
proferring the relevant alternatives, ·not any explicit clause in the answer. So what I 
am claiming here is that temporal adverbial clauses are not restricitive clauses at all, 
but merely are used to indicate that a relevant set of situations has been proferred 
by an explicit or implicit question. This explains, in some sense; their optionality in 
that if the situations under discussion are sufficiently clear, then the use of such ~ 
clause would be unnecessary. We will return to this discussion in §4. 
3.2 Association with Focus 
Since Rooth ( HJ85). and in later work by ( among others) de Swart ( HJ\Jl) m1d Krifka 
( 1992), the interaction between focus and adverbs of quantification has not gone 
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unrecognized. Consider the classic examples in (211) (originally from Rooth (1985). I 
believe) a.ud the not-so-classic example in (25). 
(2,J) a.. In Saint Petersburg, officers always escortecl [BALLERIN AS]i:. 
b. In Saiut. Petersburg, [OFFICERS]F a.lwa.ys escorted ballerinas. 
(2fi) Marcia sometimes buys [Tmkish COFFEE]F. 
It is l!Ot hard to see that the utterances in (24a.) a.ud (24b) have different. truth 
conditions. That is, the former is 1.rne if whenever officers escort.eel someonP in Saint 
Petersbmg, it was ballerinas they escorted. The latter. on the otlier hand, is I.rue if 
wlw1wver ballerinas wer<> escort.eel by someone in Sa.int Petersburg, it. was 1u1 offic,•r 
who escort.<•d them. The differeuce bet.ween the 1.wo cases, of course, is in tl1e dornaill 
or situations which always ranges over. 
Hoot.h ( l !J85) deals with t;hcsc examples in terms of a general theory of association 
with focus, a sketch of which might go something like t.his:9 (i) take the sentenc,· with­
out. the a.dvcrb, (ii) replace the focused coust.itueut with an existentially qua.ntiJiecl 
variable, (iii) ump the result into the restrictive clause, (iv) map the origina.l sentence 
into t.he nuclear scope (von Finl.el 1995:16). As au example, consider t.hP utterance 
i11 (2fi ). In this rnse, the fornsed constituent is Turkish coffer so we repla.ce that. with 
,rn exist.entially quantified variable of t.lw appropria.t.e type. This will give us a set. of 
sit.uations in which Marcia. buys something, all(! we t.ake that t.o be the rest.rict.icrn of 
iomdimrs. If we put the fon1sed constituent back and take the resulting propositio,1 
ils th<' nuclear scope, we get close to the correct truth conditions. Nan1ely, that some 
of t.lw situa.tions iu which Marcia buys somethiug are also situations in wl1id1 she 
buys Turkish coffee. 
As elegant and correct as this seems for the simple examples above.various coun­
terexamples to t.his proposal have surfaced in t.he literature in recent yea.rs. Most of 
them arc of the t.yp<' iu (2(i) (this one is like one from Partee (l!J91 ), and others have 
br,rn1 inclepencleutly proposed by Vallduvi ( 1992) and Roberts ( 1991) ). 
(Hi) a. Ja11 ,dways gives the awa.rd to the [GRADUATE ST\JDENTS]ic. 
b. No, PETER always gives the award t.o the graduate students, ancl l'vlARC'lA 
does too. 
Now, i{oot.h ( 1985) predicts that (2Ga) should mean something like the following: in 
all those cases in· which .Ja.n gives the award to someoue, it is the grach1at.e students 
t.hat she gives the aware! to. (26b) is predicted to mean that. whenever sonwmw 
gives the award t.o t.he graduate students, it. is Peter, and t.l;is contradicted by t.he 
continuation. But (2Gb) is not int.erna.lly coutradictory, and should mea.11 somet.hiug 
like in all t.hose cases in which Pet.er gives handouts to someone, it. is the graduate 
st.uclent.s t.ha.t he gives handouts to. This is a problem for lfoot.h ( 1985 ). Tha.L is, 
if prosodic prorninence determines focus and focus determines the domain of alway.,. 
weare left. without. an explanation for how the quantifier in (2(ib) can have t.he same 
domain as the one in (26a). On the other hand, note that. this problem dews not 
"I,udos t,o von Fii1tel (IU95) to boiling it down to these essentials. The int.crested 1·cadcr will. of 
course, consult. Rooth (1985) for the technical det.a.ils, 01· Kriflrn ( 1992) for a more-refined ve1·sion. 
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arise if we assume that it is not the prosodic focus, pe'I' se, that gives rise to the 
domain of always, but rather that it is the question under discussion that profers 
the relevant set of alternatives in this case. The utterance in (26a), by virtue of its 
prosody. is presupposed to be congruent with a question whose Q-alternatives is a set 
of propositions where Jan always gives an award to someone. Then, as Roberts ( 1995) 
suggests in a parn.llel example involving only, in order to explain the relevance of the 
utterance of (26b) to the immediately preceding utterance, given its parallel form 
and contrasting prosodic focus, we can assume that the second speaker is offering a 
CCHTPction 1,o the first. The alternatives under consideration, it seems. are not just, 
cases in which .Jan gives an award to someone. but rather cases in which so1neo11C' 
gives an awa.rcl to someone (otherwise, the interlocutors would not care about Peter). 
Ju his ut.t.erauce, then, the second speaker attributes to Peter a property which the 
first speakC'r attributed to .Jan. That propert,y is that when he or she gives a,n award 
to someone. it is the graduate students that he/she gives it to. 
It should be noted. however, that the problem with Rooth's theory is not limited 
to cases iuvolving "corrective" focus. Any case in which a number of questions under 
discussion could in principle be being addressed will be problematic. For example. 
consider the exchange in (27). 
(2i) a. Who does .Jan give her handouts to? 
b..)an always gives all of her handouts to the [GRADUATE STUDENTS]F. 
An association with focus theory like that of Rooth, Krifka or de Swart will predict 
that the utterance in (27b) should mean something like the following: the situations 
iu which .Ja,n gives all of her handouts to someone are a subset of the situations where 
she gives all of her handouts to the graduate students. Now, imagine a situation where 
.Jan has some handouts and decides to keep some for herself before distributing thP rest 
t,o both t.lw graduate students and the faculty. Such a situation, it seems. would l)P 
inconsistcut with the utt.era.nce in (27b), yet the theory would predict the opposite. 
That is, this wouldn't be a situation where .Jan distributes all of her handouts to 
som<>one (slw has decided to keep some for herself), so it shouldn't have to also be 
a situat.iou where she gives aU of her ha.ndouts to the graduate students (leaving 
J,rn ,free t,o distribute them to anyone in the department). Indeed, in this case. the 
association with focus theory seems to predict the wrong domain entirely. The correct 
truth condit.ions should be more like the following: in cases where Jan has handouts 
and gives diem to someone, she gives all of them to the graduate students. Again. 
the key is the question under discussion. That is, if the question under discussion 
is the locus for the relevant alternatives, the intuitive domain of the Q-adverb in 
(27b) corresponds exactly to the alternatives proferred by the explicit question in 
(27a). Root.h's truth conditions, on the other hand. would be more appropriate as au 
auswer to the question in ( 28). 
(28) Who does Jan give all of her handouts to'? 
In this case, both the question and answer can refer to a situation in which Jan has, 
for example, three separate handouts and only gives the full of set of three to the 
graduate students. Note that Rooth's truth conditions do not rule out .Jan giving the 
just two of the handouts to the faculty, and this seems correct given the situation 
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sketched above. The point to take from all this, of course, is that it is not the utterance 
itself ( or the prosodic focus of the utterance itself) that determines the domain of the 
adverbs in these cases. Rather, it is the question to which the utterance is a response 
t.hat is· important. as I have been claiming all along. 
3.3 Presuppositional Restriction 
The effect of presupposition on quantificational structure has been noted several 
tinies, most prominently by Berman (1991), but also by Schubert & Pelletier (HJ89) 
and others. That is, in examples like (29), the presuppositions of the nuclear scope 
appear to partially define the cases being quantified over. 
(2!J) a. A cat always lands on its feet. 
b. l\fa.rcia usually takes "the bus home when it rains. 
!11 (:Wa.), which appeared originally in Schubert & Pelletier, the propositio1i.expi-essed 
is not that it is ·true in all cases that a cat lands on its feet (niost of us take this 
nt.t.erance t.o be true,·while we do not expect to b.e pelted by falling cats on the way 
l.o the office). Rather, the sentence means something like the following: in all cases 
where a cat is falling towards the ground, it lands on its feet. Similarly, in (29b), 
WP have previously observed that the domain of usually is not the set of situations 
where it. rains, the set of situations where it rains and where Marcia goes home. This 
"'additionar domain restriction is readily explained by a principle such as Berman's 
(HJm). which is given in (30). 
(::IO) Berman's Presupposition Hypothesis: 
The hypothesis is the following: in the logical representation of a 
quantified sentence ( as analyzed in terms of restricted quantification). 
the presuppositions of the nuclear scope become part of the restrictive 
term. (Berman 1991:88-89) 
That is. in the case of (29a), land lexically presupposes tha.t its subject sta.rts out. 
falling through the air. This gives us something close to the restriction we want.. Ju 
(29b). we can a.ssmne that taking the bus home entails an intent to go home. aml this 
too gives us something like the correct domain in this case. . 
As Johnston (1994) notes, that such a principle would hold should not lw surpris­
ing given the general nature of quantification. Tha.t is, he points out, a. qua.ntifica­
tional sLatment can be thought of as being a.bout how many of those cases which meet 
the description in the restriction satisfy the test in the nuclear scope. The fact that 
the nuclear scope"s presuppositions appear to constrain those cases in the rest.ricti~n 
can be thought of as a. means to ensure that no quantifica.tional ca.se fails to satisfy 
the t.est. in the nuclear scope because of presupposition failure. If that was the case. 
it. would not be ''fair" to ask whether or not tha.t. case satisfied the nuclear scope. IU 
This makes sense. but it suggests a mo.re general rec1uireme1it t.ha.t the cases in the 
domain be -relevant to the discussion at hand'' in order for the quantification to lw 
considered fair. That is, when checking a certain case in the domain against the test. 
10The term -fair". presented in Johnston, is credited t.o Ladusaw (p.c.) 
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in the nucle1tr scope, we would not want to check cases that, for the purposes of the 
discussion at. ha.ncl. were irreleva.nt. These will include cases tha.t. violate tlw presup­
positions of tlw nuclear scope, but will also include situations tha.t clo not support a.ny 
of the alternatives proferred by the question under discussion. For example. consider 
1,he ut.terance in (31). ·· 
(:ll) .Jan 1m1ally butters her bread. 
The truth conditions for this sentence are something. like the following: in typical 
ca.ses wher<' .fan has bread and is going to ea.t it, she butters it. That is, we wouldn't. 
want. this sentence to be false if .Jan didn't btttter her bread before placing it in 
the refrig<>rator. And, while the first part of the above dorna.in restriction ca.n bre 
a.ttrilrnted t.o a lexical presupposition associated with the possessive pronoun hr·r. 
t.here is not.l1ing about the nuclea.r scope tha.t. presupposes tlia.1, .Ja.n is a.bout to ea.I 
her bread. 11 ,Jan could, in principle, be buttering bread as pa.rt of a bake-off. or 
lrntkriug bread to give to someone else to eat. That .Jan is about to E·at her bread is 
an implicature, but it still finds its wa.y into the nuclear scope. Wh_y'? Because, out 
of the blue. the most easily imagined situation under discussion which is compatible 
wit.h .Jan buttering her bread is one in which she is a.bout to eat it herself. It is quite 
easy to defeat this implicature and in this case the component of the restriction tha.t. 
requires t.hat ..Jan be about. to eat her bre«d is also defeated. The example in (:l2) 
illustrates. 
(:12) .Jan l\sually butters her bread before feeding it to the pigeons in Golden C:a.t.e 
Park. 
111 any case. we take Berman's arguments in favor of the presuppositious of the nuclear 
SC'ope const.raining the set of situations in the restridive clause to he useful a.nd 
ba.sically correct. We note, however, that this hypothesis is incomplete a.nd would in 
addition reject tha.t any explicit cop.ying of this informa.tion be clone a.t the level of 
logical form. It will be argued that the effect described by Berman follows na.turnlly 
from the pragmatic view of domain restriction sketched in fj4. a.nd that. such an 
acrnunt. is 1tltima.tely more complete. That is. the effects described iu this sec.Liou 
will follow 11<1.t.urnlly from our theory of presupposition in genera.I. a.ucl the t.l1eory will 
ext,•nd to 1.l1e problematic cases reviewed a.bovc>. 
A Pragmatic Account 
Iu this section, I introduce a theory of a.dverbs of quantification tha.t trea.t.s these 
elements as genernlizecl quantifiers, but rejects the notion that their restriction is 
made explicit. in logica.l form a.nd computed by gramma.tica.l processes. Instead, T 
will claim that Q-a.dverbs rnnge freely over a set of relevant. situations. aud that. a 
conspiracy of pragmatic processes determines what this set. of situations will be. 
4.1 A Situation Semantics for Adverbial Quantification 
We begin by ,1.clopt,ing 1-i:rnt,zer's (1989) version of situation semantics, which can be 
taken to involve (a.t lea.st) the following ingredients. 
lll am grateful t.o Christian lnnerhoffer (p.c.) for making this clear to me. 
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s the sel of possible situations 
A the set of possible individuals 
~ r:;_ Sx S the 'part-of' relation 
p(S') the power set of S, the set of p1'0positions 
H' r:;_ S' the set of possible worlds 
As may or ma.y not be evident from the above, possible situations and possiblf' in­
dividuals are the primitives, a.nc\ situations themselves stand in a 'pa.rt-of' rela.tio11. 
Tha.t. is, it is possible for one situation to contain another. Th<" set of worlds a.re 
ta.ken to be the maximal elements in S with respect to the ·pa.rt-of relation, and 
propositions a.re ta.ken to be persistent sets of situations. That is, if a. proposition 
contains some situa.tion ,, which supports it, it must contain all the super.itua.t.ions 
of that situation, up to and including the world w, tha.t s is a part of. 
The idea, then, that we've been assuming throlighout the paj)er but \1ow · want 
to make explicit is tha.t adverbs of quantification relate sets of situations. just. a.s 
determiners rela.te sets of individuals. So, for example, the meaning of a sentence.like 
Tiu heat is always on whrn it is cold can be intuitively stat.eel a.s the following: tlw 
sit.uat.ions which support the proposition is cold (al some timf t) also support th<' 
prnpostion the hwt .;s on (at some ffme t). 12 . R,1,nging over situa.tions in this way, 
however, presents a problem in light of the fa.ct that a.ny situa.t.ion may contain or 
lw couta.ined by another.' We risk counting things more tha.n once, as the ,following 
example involving aJrequency adverb illustra.tes.13 
(:J:l) John climbed Mt. Holyoke twice. 
Now. suppose we want to count the situations in which John climbed Mt.. Holyoke. As 
von Fintel points out, even if John climbed Mt. Holyoke once, it. will be the rnse t.hat 
many situa.tions will exist in which .John climbed Mt. Holyoke. For example. there is 
a. situation that includes John climbing Mt. Holyoke and nothing else, and a. situation 
that includes .John climbing Mt. Holyoke and his celebratory dinner afterwards, and 
so on. The ca.tch is that the first situation is really pa.rt of the second, so both 
shouldn't be counted sepa.rate:ly. What others have proposed t.o do in this case is to 
count the minimal situations that support the fa.ct that John climbed Mt. Holyoke, 
i.e .. situations that have no proper parts that also support this fa.ct. Given a set 8 
of situations, we can define the minimal situations in S' as in (34). 
(:J4) Minimality (Berman 1987, Heim 1991): 
m:in(S') = { s E 5' I Vs' ES', s' ~ s =} s' = s} 
The function 1nin(S) gives us the set of situations in 8 that do not have proper part.s 
that are also in the set. In the case of a. proposition, the set of minimal situations 
that support it are those situations which contain just enough parts to support the 
proposition, but no "extra." pa.rts. 14 
"w.,·n be playing fa.st and loose with the notion of time throughout. 
13This example is due to von Fint.el ( 1995). 
14 von Finte1 ( 1995) provides a.n interest.ing discussion of the problems 't.Iia.t this view of minimality 
presents with 1·espect. to pl'Opositfons involving st.at.ive or at.elic predicates. Like von Fint.el. I will 
le~.ve t.lw pl'oblem of individuating situations correctly in these cases t.o furt.hel· research. 
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So. with this technical problem out of the way. we are now in a position to provide 
a semant.ics for Q-adverbs. To facilitate the discussion, we introduce the example in 
(:3!ia), which we take to have tl:e logical form in (3':ib). As before, the capital letters 
in this example indicate intonatio1;a] focus, while the functionally focused constituent 
i., marked with subscript F. 
(:J.'i) a. fan always buys :Tmkish COFFEE1F 
b. always(Jan buys Turkish coffee) 
Now. J would like to claim that this sentence is Interpreted in accordance with tl:e :·u:e 
in (:JCi). a rule which at first n:ay seem surprising in that no refeence to an explicit 
restriction is made. 
(:J(i) Interpretation of [always 01: 
Let R <;;; S x S such that: 
'r/,,,8 1 ES. < 8,81 >ER ¢c? .;' E mi,1(/(s)). then: 
~ ~" 11s E lalways q.,; iff vs' such tb,t < s../ > E R, :i/1 such that m1cl 
,," E [0. 
A few observations, it seems, are ir: order at this time. First, observe that the rnle 
above is l'<'miniscent of ma:1y rnles that have been proposed for mocials. That is. 
J claim here that the interpretation o" a Q-aclwrb is clepenclent on a function f. 
whirh looks a bit like a functio:1 that Erntzer (1US1) called the modal base. The 
intuitive idea is the same: we want f to return contextual informat:on that is rnrneho\\' 
relevant. to :he int<"rlocutor, iu a discourse. Jt differs from Erntzer's, ;1owever. in tLll 
hers is a fundion from situations to sets of propm'tions. i.e .. to somet:1'ng !ike a 
local common ground whereas J take it to l)e a fu:1ct:on from .situations to a set 
oJ' situat.ioHs. more akin to a context set. Of coL:rse. one cot:lcl recover the local 
rontext set from the Kratzeria1c modal base simply by taking its intersection. My 
choice is motivated purely by technica:jpresentational reasons. 2,s ,houlcl become 
evident shortly. 
Q-adverbs. it is claimed, range over t11e mini1:1al situations ir: tbe local co11t,ext 
set. Return'ng to our exan:ple, sup,)o,e om local contex'.. set con,istecl jus'. of tl:me 
minimal situa,ions in which Jan was buyi11g son:ed:ing.: 5 lmuitively, ll'ha: ol1cuys 
Sf'ems to rPquire is that ali :hese sit·Ja.tiolls are also situations i:1 which .Jar: bought 
Turkish coffee. This. however, cannot be loLally co:Tect. That is, recall t!ic:t tlw 
situatio11s we are ranging over a.re n1ininu-d situations. t11e .snudlest ~ittrnt,ions that 
satisfy the conjunction of propositions i:1 the contex'.ualJy-g'ven restrictio:1. These 
situations. Lowever, since they are mininrn.l, may not be large enough to satisfy the 
proposition expressed by the nuclear scope. What the rule in (:36; requires, :hen. is 
that <"ach minimal situation in the restriction be pa.rt of (i.e., be extend2.ble co I a 
situation that satisfies the 11uclear scope. b our example. the1:, we are requi:·ing tba.t 
each of t.lw minimal situations in whicl: .Jan is 'J:1ying so:nething can r)e extended to 
a situation in which she is buying Tmkish coffee. Thi.s .seems correct. 
15Tlw proce::;:s by whkh t.l1is cctn be determined w:ll he tiw foCl:s of t.lw renrnincle:· of t.!1is ;:icqwr. 
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A huge question, however. remains. How was it tlrnt f(.,) picked out just those 
sit.nations in which .Jan was buying something? It is one t.hi11g to sa)' that the denota­
tio!l of .f is contextuaJly determined. It is the burckn, however. of a pmcly prngmi\tic 
account t.o be explicit a.bout how this contextual determination worh. and thi\l is 
tl,e subject of the remaining sections of the paper. 
4.2 Contextual Domain Restriction 
Throughout the pa.per, we have argued that a widE' variety of contextual i11fon11at.io11 
is c·mployed to restrict. the domain of Q-adverhs, including most 11ot.ably prcsuppusi­
tional information and a.ltE'rnat.ives proferrcd by the quest.ion under disrnssio11. A11d. 
in the formal ,H·count. of the pn•vious subsection, 1w have a posilccl il fu11ct.io11 / 11ul 
unlil«• l~ra.t.zer's modal base which providE's a. formal "hook" to this cont<>xtu,il infor­
!llat.ion hy 1naking available a local context set, \vhirh \Ve have ~uggc-,tccl i:, the :.;ct 
oi' situations over which Q-adverbs range. The time has conw now to link t.hese \ wo 
id,,·as together by providing an account of how the local co11texl set is determined i11 
t.<>rrns of our previous observations about presupposition and congruence. 
So rnnsidcr again the example from t.hP previous subsecticrn, rciwatcd here in 
(:l,). ,rnd recall that we decided that its doma.in should be somethinµ, like t lw set of 
,ill minima.I situations in which Jan buys sonwthing. T11is, ol' course. is the domain 
predict.eel by an attraction with focus theory, and we would 11·a11t om results lo IJl' 
co11sistent with that. body of work. 
(T,) .Jan always buys [Turkish COFFEE]r 
111 considf'l'ing this example, w,, observe first that this uLt.ern11ce is a felicitous re.spo11.se 
to the question in (:JS). That is, one possible cont.ext in which tliis (:3',) rnuld be 
ut.t.ered is in a. context wlwre the question under discussion is (:3S). 1" 
(:lS) Wlwt docs .Jan buy? 
Now. reralling our discussion fron1 §2, the Q-alt.ernativPs nssoclo t.('d wi t.h thi~ que:,t io11 
is llie s<>t of all propositions wlwre it is lnw that .Jan bu,vs sonwlhing. Th" u11io11 
of this set of propositions. in turn, will rPturn a single proposiLion which supports 
sit.ua.t.ions like om· in which .fan buys lndi,m coffee. one in which she buys Turki.sh 
coffpc and so forLh. It will not, however. inclurlf' sit.nations in which .Jan cl0Ps11'1 
buy anything. Tlw minima.I situations in this resulting sPt arr tho~e situations just 
large enough to support that Jan buys these various types of coffee while supporting 
nothing p]sc. It is these situations tha.t we want t.o (]Uantify over. As a first st.ab. 
then. at. what f should look like, it seems that <1t very least we \\'oulcl like it to picl, 
0111. the union of tlw Q-altcrua.tives of the quest.ion under discussion. A rn11strai11t 
like the one in 09) does the trick. 
lGJI could also a11swer the question IVhaf doo Jan rd ways buy"!. which for t.lll' purprn-,('.S of t hi:-. 
discussion. we will take t.o be more or less equivalent. to (a8). It. may lw thl' nv::e tlrnt. Ill a quest10n 
like (:l8), an ilnplicit. Q-a<lverb (something like typically) is present. 111 any rnse. I would likt- to 
imggest. t.hat: in l'OBlJ.Hlt,ing t.he focal alt.cmatives for utterances like {37) nnd tbe Q-alt.Pnrntives fo1· 
quest.ions, it. is possible to "raise" the Q~adverb out of it.r, surface posit.ion and thus rcmovf' it from 
C;onsiderat.ion when the alternat.ivcs arc computed. There is probably a more sophistical.eel way to 
look at. this. 
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(:39) For any utterance¢, with question under discussion o: 
Vs ES, f(s) = UQA(a) 
But why should this be? Well, recall that the Q-alterna.tives corresponding to a. given 
question can be ta.ken to encode the set of propositions under consideration. Indeed. 
it, is the set. of Q-alterna.tives that a.re being "asked" in any situation that supports 
the accept.a.nee of the question. And, if by being asked.· we mean that their truth is 
be.ing eva.lua.ted, it. is not umea.sona.ble to expect that interlocutors would consider 
t.he situations which support. the answer to the question as pa.rt. of a. hypothetical 
cont.ext. set. so that they could be evaluated with respect to other infonna.tion that, 
t;hey heliew to be true. Since / gives us this smt of hypothetical context set.. it is 
not. umeasonable to expect that the situations proferrecl by the Q-a.lternat.ives would 
be ma.de a.vailable by it. Looking a.t it another way, ta.king the union of the Q­
alterna.tivPs to be a. pa.rt of a. lac.a.I context set ca.n be thought of a.s a consequence 
of accepting i.he presuppositional content of a question into the common ground. 
Ciu·lson (HJl:l:J). in fa.ct, claimed that the presuppositional content. of a question wa.s 
in fa.ct. th<' disjunction of its possible answers (plus t.he admissibility of its parts). 
Intuitively~ I think. this is intended to capture the idea that, the possible a.nswi,rs to 
a question must be felicitous with respect to the current context. That is. it. should 
not. be possible~ t,o ask felicitously a.sk a question whose only possible answers conflic·t 
wit.h infornmtion already presupposed. 
ludeed. a.s much compatible information a.s possible from the global common 
ground should be present in the hypothetical context set up by /, since the interlocu­
tors would not want to eva.lua.te these alternatives in a vacuum, but rather against. 
all i-nforma.t.ion that they believe to be true. An argument related to this wa.5 ma.de 
my Robert.s (199,5b), who argued that all hypothetical ·contexts a.re assumed by inter­
locutors to be optima.lly realistic for reasons simila.r to those suggested above. That. 
is. she argtl<'d the following: 
..(ThP hypothesis a.hove) is motivated by the need to assure tha.t, a.ll the 
interlocutors· assumptions are as similaJ' as possible. whether these a.re as­
sumptions a.bout the actual world - for which the con;mon ground defines 
the rn.ndidate set or a.bout hypothetical or counterfa.ctual contexts un­
. der discussion. Those aspects of hypothetical or counterfa.ctual contexts 
which aren't spelled out by the spealrnr are assumed to be identical with 
what. we know a.bout actuality, a.s reflected in th<:" common ground. at 
least. insofar as this doesn't lead to contra.dictions with wha.t's explicitly 
spelled out. This enables us to a.void misunderstanding, while minimizing 
the need for detailed (and oft.en redundant) description of hypothetical 
cont,exts. (Roberts 1995b:22t 
We can capture this idea formally by altering the constraint in (:39) along the lines in 
(40). Here. we simply require that the situations returned ,by fa.Isa be situations tha.t 
satisified a.II t.he propositions in the common ground a.t the time of the uttera.nce.1' 
(40) For any utterance¢ with question under discussion o: 
11 We follow Roberts (1995) and take CG to be a function from moves (utt,erances) t.o t.lw set. of 
proposit,ions in the common grouncl. 
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\/.,ES, .f(s) = (nCO(ef>)) n (UQA(a)) 
Returning to our simple example, then, a derivation of the relevant restriction 
would proceed as in (41), with .f(s) being set to all the situations which support 
answers to What did Jan buy'?) for some arbitrary s E S. 
(41) .f(s) = { s I (:la E D)Jan buys u is true ins} n {s Is E nCG(¢)} 
·min(.f(,;)) = the minimal situations in the set above. 
And the proposition in (:38) will be true if all those situations on the last line can 
be extended into situations where Jan buys Turkish coffee, which is what, we want.· 
Taken another way, we can take the utterance as choosing choosing from the context 
sd only those buying situations which can be extended to situations where .Jan buys 
Turkish coffee. 
The account. above also gives a satisfactory result for cases involving what has 
been argued to be explicit restrictive clauses. Recall, for example, t!w sentences in 
(Hl). one of which is repeated here in (·12). 
(·12) Marcia always ta.kes the bus home when it rains. 
Now. depending on the focal structure of the utterance, this utterance can felicitously 
answer either question in (4,3), as well as a hos·t of more general questions. 
(4:3) a. How does Marcia get home when it rains? 
b. When does Marcia take the bus home? 
Each of these questions. of comse, is associated with a distinct set, of alternatives. In 
the case of (4:3a) this will be the set in (,!fa). In the case of (4%), it will be the set 
ill (44b). 
('14) a. { p I (:JR E D)[p = Marcia Rhome when it rains]} 
b. { p I (:lq E Dl[p = Marcia takes the bus home q]} 
Setting the union of each of these equal to f (s) will give us the following results: in 
the case of ( 4:3a.), we predict that the utterance is true iff all the minima.I situations 
in which Marcia does something to get home when it rains can be extended int.o 
situations where she takes the bus home when it rains: in the case of (4:lb), we predict 
that. the utterance is true iff ~11 the minimal situations in which Maicia takes the bus 
home when can be extended to situations where Marcia takes the bus home when it 
rains. That is, we seem to get the two readings observed by .Johnston ( l!J\J4 ), one of 
which corresponds to the case in which the when-clause provides the restriction, while 
the other corresponds to Johnston's head-restriction reading. I think these are both 
correct results, although it seems a little odd to include something like a w/u:n-clausE' 
i11 both the restriction and the nuclear scope. Q-adverbs, however, are conservative, 
so this does not affect the interpretation adversely. 
There is, however, some subtlety in tlw data, that is uot immediately preclictecl 
by our account. The examples in (45) were presented in Johnston (HJ\J,l) a.ncl incleecl 
WPre taken to motivate his claims about the Mapping Hypothesis. 
(45) a.. Marcia always takes the bus home when it. rains. 
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b. vVhen it rains, Marcia always takes.the bus home . 
.Johnston observed, conectly I think, that while the example in ( 45a.) has two readings 
available for it. (the two we have been discussing thus for), the example in (4,5b).does 
not.. That is, in our terms, (45b) cannot answer the question in (42b). Auel, since 
our notion of congruence is essentiaUy semantic, we have no way (on the surface) to 
expla.in why this might be the case. 
The answer, I suspect, has to do with the nature of topicalization, and more 
specifically, what role left-dislocated elements play with respect to information st;.uc­
t ure.· Indeed. VaUduvi ( 1992) and others have suggested that left-dislocated elements 
con·c,spond Lo old informa.tion, or are crucially presupposed. As a felicitous 1·c•spo11sc' 
t.o (al:Zb). however. w<c would expect that the when-clause be in focus, or new. Clearly, 
a lwt.ter explauation is needed, but I believe that the observations here suggest a st.ep 
iu the right direction. 
As a final illustrative example, recall the example in (:31), repeated here in (45) 
and fixed up with explicit focus marking. 
(46) .Jan a.lways [butters her BREAD],,. 
This, of course, is congruent with a question whose Q-alternatives correspond to a 
set of propositions in which ,Jan does something, but this does not seem to be enough 
t.o derive the correct restriction. That is, if we set f(s) to the Q-alternatives and 
stop there, we predict that this sentence should mean that all minimal situations in 
which .Jan does something should be extendable into situations where Ja.n butters her 
bread. This is dearly too strong. 
AU is not. lost, however, if we remember what f(s) returns - namely, a hypothetical 
context which is a.s much like the actual context as possible with respect to the 
information in the common ground. And, if an utterance like (46) is accepted by the 
interlocutors, the (global) context set will entail a.II of this utterance's presuppositions. 
om' of which is the presupposition that .Jan has bread (associated with the possessive 
her). Now, if the hypothetica.l context set is as much like the real context set as 
possible, it too will entail that Jan has bread, i.e., all the situations i1~ the hypothetical 
context set will he situations in which Ja.n has brea.d. Our resulting doma.iu, then, 
will be the set of minima.I situations inwhich .Jan is doing something and in which 
Jan has bread. We can pla.usibly argue further that an implicature associated with 
the word butter (i.e., that you a.re about to eat what you butter) further restricts the 
domain, giving us more or less the set of situations we want: the minimal situations 
in which .Jan is doing something, has bread, and is about to eat it. These all should 
lw extendable into situations in which Jan butters her bread, for the utterance to be 
t.rue. 
Conclusions and Issues for Further Study 
I have provided a situation-based theory of Q-adverbs in which their domain is com­
puted pragmatically, without reference to an implicit tripartite representation or any 
grammatical operation. In addition to being more attractive from a conceptual stand­
point, such a theory stands to better account for cases discussed above in which con­
textual information plays a indispensable role in determining the domain of these 
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operators. In future work, I would like to better examine cases in .Johnston ( l9ll4) 
and Diesing ( 19\lO; 19ll2) that have been taken to motivate an implicit tripartite struc­
ture. and to better compare the theory sketched here to other pragmatic theories of 
this phenomena, such as that of Schwarzschild (1994), Rooth (Hl92) and von Fintel 
(19\l5). 
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